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TORTS-PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A NEW FINISH ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
BMW OFNORTHAMERICA v. GoRE, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
I. INTRODUCTION
In BMW of North America v. Gore,' the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a $2,000,000 punitive award against BMW of North
America for failure to disclose presale paint repair to Dr. Ira Gore, a new
car purchaser, violated BMW's constitutional right to due process. In a
five-to-four decision, the Court held that the $2,000,000 punitive award
exceeded constitutional boundaries.2 The Supreme Court concluded the
award was grossly excessive by applying three guiding factors to the
circumstances of BMW' The Court examined the degree of reprehensibility
of BMW's conduct, the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages, and the
civil penalties applicable to similar misconduct.4 Although the Supreme
Court's previous attempts to set substantive limits on punitive awards and
to provide objective guidelines for examining punitive awards have been
fruitless,' the Court's most recent attempt in BMW harvested a victory for
the defense camp because the Court finally ruled the punitive award too
big.6
This casenote discusses the constitutionality of punitive damages prior
to and in light of BMW of North America v. Gore. Following the facts of
BMW, the note addresses the development of a framework for examining
punitive awards prior to BMW Thereafter, the casenote discusses BMW's
addition to the framework and the decision's impact on future litigation
involving punitive damages.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
2. Id. at 1604.
3. Id. at 1598.
4. Id. at 1598-99.
5. See Mark A. Dombroff, Constitutional Limitations on Punitive Damages Revisited,
CAl A.L.I.-A.B.A., July 28, 1995, at 150.
6. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that
the exercise is engaging, but ultimately tells us only this: too big will be judged
unfair. What is the Court's measure of too big? Not a cap of the kind a
legislature could order, or a mathematical test this Court can divine and impose.
Too big is, in the end, the amount which five Members of the Court bridle.
BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1617 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But see Kevin Johnson & Earle
Eldridge, High Court Reins in Punitive Damages: Ruling in BMW Case Divides Legal
Arena, USA TODAY, May 21, 1996, at lB. The attorney representing BMW, Andrew Frey,
stated that the Court's decision "open[s] the door for judges to exert meaningful control over
verdicts they feel are excessive." Id. Sherman Joyce, the president of the American Tort
Reform Association said that the Court's decision "ask[s] judges to apply a standard of
common sense in defining what really is egregious conduct." Id.
519
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II. FACTS
In 1990, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr. purchased a new 1990 BMW 535i sports
sedan for $40,750.88 from German Auto, Inc., an authorized BMW
dealership in Birmingham, Alabama.7 Nine months later, Gore took the car
to an independent auto detailer called "Slick Finish" to make the car
"snazzier than it normally would appear," although he had not discovered
any imperfections in the finish.8 The auto detailer discovered that the car
had been partially repainted and told Gore.9 The damage allegedly resulted
from exposure to acid rain while being transported from the BMW
manufacturing plant in Germany to BMW of North America's ("BMW
NA") vehicle preparation center in Brunswick, Georgia.' The extent of the
work performed at the vehicle preparation center consisted of repainting the
top, hood, trunk, and quarter panels of the car."
Since 1983, BMW's policy required disclosure to the dealer of only
those damages that cost greater than three percent of the manufacturer's
suggested retail price ("MSRP") to repair. 2 Amounting to $601, the
damage to Gore's car fell below three percent of the MSRP. 3 Gore filed
suit against BMW NA and BMW AG,14 alleging that failure to disclose the
repainting of the car amounted to suppression of a material fact.'5 At trial,
7. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1994).
8. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1593 (1996).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1593 n.l. BMW NA buys cars from the manufacturer in Germany,
Bayerische Motoren Werke, Aktiengesellschaft ("BMW AG"). BMW stated that the
occasional damages to a car's finish incurred during the Trans-Atlantic trip come in the form
of dents or scratches or exposure to environmental conditions, such as acid rain. Brief for
Petitioner at 3, BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (No. 94-896).
11. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593 n.1.
12. Id. at 1593. However, after the Alabama jury awarded Gore $4,000,000 in punitive
damages, BMW implemented a new policy requiring full disclosure of all repairs regardless
of its significance. Id. Interestingly, Alabama subsequently adopted legislation that requires
disclosure of damages greater than three percent of the MSRP. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-5
(1993). The Alabama Supreme Court did not consider the statute because "[t]he public
policy of Alabama expressed in the statute had not been enacted at the time BMW NA
adopted its policy of nondisclosure." Petitioner's Brief at 8, BMW (No. 94-896).
13. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 621. Three percent of the MSRP of Gore's car amounted to
approximately $1200. The $601 repairs to Gore's car amounted to only one and one half
percent of the MSRP. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
14. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 621-22. BMW NA is the distributor of BMW automobiles in
America. Id.
15. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. The Alabama fraud statute provides that "[s]uppression
of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud.
The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or
from the particular circumstances of the case." See ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (1993). Codified
in 1907, the Alabama fraud statute still exists. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593 n.3.
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Dr. Gore argued that the value of his repainted car was ten percent less than
the value of a car that had not been repainted.'6 Dr. Gore offered evidence
that his actual damages were $4,000 through the testimony of the former
owner of the BMW dealership. 7 The former dealership owner approximated
that a repainted BMW was valued at ten percent less than one with the
original factory finish.'8  As a basis for awarding punitive damages, Dr.
Gore established that BMW had sold 983 refinished cars since 1983 without
revealing that the cars had been repainted prior to sale.'9 BMW sold
fourteen of these refinished cars in Alabama. 0 Dr. Gore argued that a
$4,000,000 punitive award would be a proper punishment because BMW
sold approximately 1,000 vehicles without disclosing that they had been
refinished.2'
In defense, BMW urged that the finish on Dr. Gore's car simulated the
same quality as a car with the original factory finish and that its disclosure
policy did not require BMW to reveal the repair of minor damage to new
cars.22 BMW disagreed with Dr. Gore's assertion that the value of a
refinished BMW appraised less than one with the original factory finish.23
To further its argument against punitive damages, BMW claimed that the
refinished cars sold in jurisdictions outside of Alabama should have no
impact in the present action.24
The jury found BMW liable for $4,000 in compensatory damages, as
well as $4,000,000 in punitive damages, finding its disclosure policy
amounted to fraud under the Alabama statute.25 BMW then filed a post-trial
motion to have the punitive damages award set aside.26 In support of its
16. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. Ten percent amounted to approximately $4,000. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. One of the fourteen refinished cars sold in Alabama belonged to Dr. Thomas
Yates, who sued BMW on the basis of fraud. A jury awarded Dr. Yates $4,600 in
compensatory damages but denied his request for punitive damages. See Yates v. BMW of
N. Am., 642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993), cert. quashed, 642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1993).
21. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. Dr. Gore reasoned that BMW sold refinished cars at full
price when the actual value of the refinished car was ten percent less than a new car. Dr.
Gore arrived at the four million dollar figure by multiplying the approximately 1,000
refinished cars sold as new by the approximate $4,000 per car reduction in value. Id.
22. Id. "The refinishing process--which is essentially identical to that used by BMW
AG when it detects an imperfection in a car's finish as it comes off the assembly
line-involves numerous steps and quality-maximizing safeguards." Petitioner's Brief at 4,
BMW (No. 94-896) (discussing the detailed process of refinishing).
23. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1593-94; see ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20 to -21 (1993).
26. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1594.
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motion, BMW asserted that its disclosure policy complied with the
disclosure laws applicable to the automobile industry in approximately
twenty-five states.27 The strictest statutes in America mandated auto
manufacturer disclose repairs exceeding three percent of the MSRP.2s
Denying BMW's post-trial motion, the trial judge held that the $4,000,000
punitive award was not excessive.29
BMW appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, claiming that the
punitive award was unconstitutional.3" Although the Alabama Supreme
Court rejected this claim, the court reduced the punitive award to $2,000,000
finding that the jury erred in using out-of-state sales as a multiplier for
determining the punitive award.3' The court found the $2,000,000 award
constitutionally reasonable by applying factors enumerated in a previous
case.
32
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 33 to clarify when
a punitive award exceeds constitutional boundaries. 34  In a five-to-four
opinion, the Supreme Court found Dr. Gore's punitive award grossly
excessive and held that the award exceeded the bounds of a constitutional
punitive award. 5
27. Id. While some states rely on the judicial process to develop and implement
disclosure requirements, many states have enacted legislation. The Court noted that eleven
states, including Arkansas, required disclosure of repairs costing greater that six percent of
the retail price of the car. Four states required disclosure of repairs greater that three percent
of the retail price of the car. Various other states fell somewhere in between. Id. at 1596
n.1 3 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 1594. By adopting a national policy of disclosing repairs that exceeded three
percent, BMW adopted the strictest of statutory disclosure requirements. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1595.
32. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 629. The factors the court applied came from Green Oil v.
Homsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989). Using these factors, the court made several findings.
The court found that BMW's actions were reprehensible; BMW profited from its disclosure
policy; BMW's financial position would not be affected by the punitive award; the expense
of litigation was substantial; and BMW had not received criminal sanctions for the same
conduct. Also, the court found the fact that BMW was not held liable for punitive damages
in the almost identical case of Yates v. BMW of North America was merely the result of
different juries, and there was a "reasonable relationship" between the harm that occurred
from BMW's actions and the potential harm. Id. at 625-28 (citing Yates v. BMW of N. Am.,
642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). See supra note 20 for a brief discussion of Yates.
33. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).
34. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595.
35. Id. at 1604.
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III. BACKGROUND
Punitive damages36 date back to ancient times when they existed in the
form of multiple damages.3 7  The Code of Hammurabi, one of the first
recorded systems of law, awarded multiple damages as a punitive remedy
in civil cases in 2000 B.C.3" Similarly, multiple damages existed under the
Hindu Code of Manu, the Bible, and the Roman Law.39 Years later,
punitive damages appeared in thirteenth century England, developed with the
English common law, and eventually America discovered punitive damages.
A. Punitive Damages at English Common Law
Although the English common law had utilized punitive damages since
the thirteenth century,' the companion cases of Wilkes v. Woods 4 and
36. "Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and
others like him from similar conduct in the future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
908 (1979). Punitive damages are synonymous with exemplary damages. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
Exemplary damages are damages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff
over and above what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the
wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression,
malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant, and are
intended to solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings,
shame, degradation, or other aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish
the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of him, for which
reason they are also called "punitive" or "punitory" damages or "vindictive"
damages.
Id.
37. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285 (1993).
38. LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.1 (3d ed.
1995). For example, under the Code of Hammurabi, a common carrier who did not deliver
the goods had to pay five times the cost of the goods as multiple damages, and a man who
stole an ox from the temple or palace had to pay thirty fold. Id. § 1.1 n. 1.
39. Id. § 1.1. For example, under the Babylonian Code, a delivery person had to pay
five times the cost of the goods consigned to him if he was guilty of conversion. Id. § 1.1
n.2. The Bible says that a man who steals and kills or sells an ox is liable for five ox. Id.
§ 1.1 n.7 (citing Exodus 22:1). The Roman Law imposed multiple damages for usury
whereby the victim was entitled to four times the amount of interest charged over the
permissible amount. Id. § 1.2 (citation omitted).
40. RICHARD L. BLATT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRACTICE 23 (1991). In thirteenth century England, the government imposed amercements
which were fines for civil wrongs. The United States notion of punitive damages is founded
upon the English system of amercements. Id.
41. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
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Huckle v. Money42 first introduced punitive damages as a legal doctrine.4"
These cases resulted from the government's attempt to suppress the
publication of the North Briton, a pamphlet critical of King George II.4 A
jury awarded Wilkes, the editor of the paper, punitive damages as a result
of the King having his house searched and property seized with merely a
general warrant.45 Arguing that "trifling damages" would not prevent future
invasions of civil rights, the jury awarded Wilkes punitive damages for the
purpose of punishment and deterrence.46 Similarly, the court awarded
punitive damages in Huckle after the King had ordered that all of the
printers and publishers be seized in order to stop publication of the paper.47
Although the English courts first imposed punitive damages to punish and
deter future conduct," the courts later broadened the doctrine to address the
changing needs of society that the common law did not reach.49
B. Punitive Damages in Early American History
Shortly after the doctrine of punitive damages became prevalent in
England, the doctrine reached the United States. The first American case
to articulate the doctrine of punitive damages was Coryell v. Colbough. °
At this time, punitive damages served to punish the defendant, as well as
compensate the plaintiff.5 ' The role of punitive damages as a deterrent did
42. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
43. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.3(A).
44. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.3(A).
45. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.3(A).
46. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.3(A).
47. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.3(A). Huckle's detainment lasted only
six hours during which he was given beer and steak. Although his actual damages amounted
to about 20f, the jury awarded him 300f. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
48. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.3(A). One commentator wrote that after
Huckle, punitive damages were used "to punish and deter the misuse of wealth and power
that threatened the eighteenth century English social order." Rustad & Koenig, supra note
37, at 1289-90.
49. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.3(A). Several theories existed to explain
the expansion of the doctrine of punitive damages. The theories included justification for
excessive verdicts, compensation for mental anguish, deterrence of wrongdoers, redressing
unequal punishment in the criminal forum, and revenge. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note
38, § 1.3(B).
50. 1 N.J.L. 90 (1791). This case involved a breach of promise to marry in which the
defendant had impregnated the plaintiff. The Chief Justice instructed the jury "that they were
not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give
damages for example's sake, to prevent such offences in [the] future; and also to allow liberal
damages for the breach of a sacred promise and the great disadvantages which must follow
to her through life." Id. at 91.
51. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.4(A).
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not become well settled until the early eighteenth century when their
compensatory function began to diminish. 2 Coincidentally, the use of
punitive damages as compensation dwindled as the allowance of actual
damages for mental suffering increased.5" By the mid-nineteenth century,
courts awarded punitive damages to punish and deter.'
C. Constitutional Challenges to Punitive Damages
In the 1851 case of Day v. Woodworth," the United States Supreme
Court recognized the doctrine of punitive damages as well settled.56
Although the Day Court discussed punitive damages in dicta,57 courts
frequently cite Day to quash challenges to the legitimacy of punitive
damages." The Court, however, has recognized the weak precedential value
of Day."' One scholar noted this as an indication that the Court may rethink
whether punitive damages offend the Constitution.' As the size and
frequency of punitive damages awards skyrocket, 6' the modem focus of
52. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.4(A). Courts began to stray from the
compensatory aspects of punitive damages and used punitive damages to punish and deter.
SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.4(B).
53. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.4(A).
54. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 1.4(A); see Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N.Y.
440, 444 (1876) ("The judge instructed the jury that they were not confined, in awarding
damages, to giving compensation merely for the injury sustained by the plaintiff, but that
beyond this they might award damages to any extent by way of punishment to the defendant,
and as a warning to others against committing like offenses.").
55. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851). The issue at trial was whether the plaintiff had
constructed his mill-dam higher than allowed, and if he had, whether the defendant acted
lawfully in tearing down part of the plaintiff's dam that caused injury to the defendant. Id.
at 370. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to fees. Id. During the
discussion of fees, the Court also discussed punitive damages. Id. at 370-71.
56. Id. at 371. The Court stated, "It is a well-established principle of the common law,
that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the
enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff." Id.
57. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 3.1.
58. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 3.1. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159 (1967).
59. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 42 n.9 (1983) (stating that "the Day case did not
present any issue of punitive damages; the Court discussed them merely as a sidelight to the
costs-and-fees issue presented").
60. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 3.1.
61. John Calvin Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72
VA. L. REv. 139 (1986). One of the highest punitive awards as of 1955 was $75,000.
BLATr, supra note 40, at 23. Despite the increase in, and frequency of, punitive awards, the
modem function of punitive awards remains consistent with the historical function of
controlling the misuse of wealth and power. One author notes that this principle has
extended generally to protect citizens from the abuses of our corporate society. Rustad &
UALR LAW JOURNAL
punitive damage litigation centers on the constitutionality of punitive
damages.62
The constitutional challenges to punitive damages fall into two
categories-Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges.63
The Excessive Fines Clause is the root of the Eighth Amendment challenge,
and the Due Process Clause is the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment
challenge.' The Eighth Amendment became effective in 1791 as a part of
the Bill of Rights; however, the Fourteenth Amendment did not become
effective until 1868.65
1. The Eighth Amendment Challenge
Courts have repeatedly denied Eighth Amendment challenges to
punitive damages. In 1977, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment did not apply outside of the criminal arena.ss However,
almost ten years later in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,6 7 the Court
noted that the Eighth Amendment challenge to punitive damages was an
important issue and needed to be addressed in a proper case. Shortly after
Lavoie, in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,69 the Court again
Koenig, supra note 37, at 1309.
62. BLATr, supra note 40, at 26.
63. BLATr, supra note 40, at 26; see also, Jeffries, supra note 61, at 147-59 (discussing
both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to punitive damages).
64. BLATr, supra note 40, at 27. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. BLATr, supra note 40, at 27.
66. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). "Eighth Amendment scrutiny
is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions." Id.
67. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
68. Id. at 828-29. Lavoie was an Alabama case in which the defendant challenged a
$3,500,000 punitive award on the basis of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, as well as on due process grounds. Id. at 828. The Court vacated and
remanded the case because of a procedural glitch in the trial court when the judge did not
properly recuse himself, and thus the Court did not need to addresses the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Id. at 828-29.
69. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
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refused to decide an Eighth Amendment challenge to punitive damages
because the appellant did not properly raise the issue in the lower court.70
Finally, in Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,71 both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to punitive damages were raised in the
anti-trust context. The Court ended the uncertainty of Eighth Amendment
challenges to punitive damages holding, in a seven-to-two opinion, that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not restrain punitive
damages awarded in a suit between private parties.72 Although the Court
refused to address the Fourteenth Amendment challenge because the
petitioner failed to raise the issue in the lower court, four justices in separate
opinions revealed their views of the excessiveness issue and indicated the
existence of due process restraints on punitive damages.
73
70. Id. at 77-78.
71. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
72. Id. at 275. The Court stated that punitive damages would not violate the Eight
Amendment "when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to
receive a share of the damages awarded." Id. at 264. Contrary to the Court's opinion, one
author suggests that the Eighth Amendment argument could be analyzed similarly to the
Court's analysis in Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Theodore B. Olson & Theodore
J. Boutrous, Jr., Constitutional Restraints on the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L.
REv. 907 (1990). In Gertz, the Court held that punitive damages may not be awarded in
libel cases in the absence of actual malice because of the effect punitive damages may have
on free speech guaranteed under the First Amendment. Id. at 921. Even though the Court
later limited Gertz to cases involving speech of public concern, the principle remains the
same:
Just as large damage awards threaten the values protected by the first amendment,
excessive punitive damages threaten the values sought to be protected by the
eighth amendment's prohibition of excessive fines. There is no logical reason
why the Court's justification for the inapplicability of the eighth amendment to
punitive damages would not apply with equal force to the first amendment.
Id.
73. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 268. Andrew Frey, the attorney who represented
Browning-Ferris and BMW before the Supreme Court, commented that this decision merely
shut the door on Eighth Amendment challenges, but that many constitutional issues involving
punitive damages remained to be decided. Andrew L. Frey, Do Punitives Fit the Crime?,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9, 1989, at 13. He noted that "[t]he court is likely waiting for a case that
clearly and cleanly presents one of the next generation of issues, preferably a case in which
the lower court has itself addressed the issue in more than cursory fashion." Id. The
Supreme Court did exactly this when it granted certiorari in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), the first Supreme Court case to rule on the constitutionality
of punitive damages under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Halsip, 499
U.S. at 3.
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2. The Fourteenth Amendment Challenge
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to punitive damages exist in two
forms---substantive and procedural due process challenges. 4 Substantive
due process raises the issue of whether the Due Process Clause imposes a
limit on the size of an award.75 On the other hand, procedural due process
questions whether the legal process was "fundamentally fair" and "rationally
related to legitimate purposes."76 When used to challenge the constitutional-
ity of punitive damages, the due process argument focuses on the procedures
utilized to determine punitive damages, specifically the jury's lack of
instruction in assessing a punitive award.77 Thus, a potential violation of
due process occurs when the punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive
damages could be satisfied by a smaller punitive award, as opposed to a
large award bearing no relation to the actual damages or purposes of
punishment and deterrence.7"
In the past seven years, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in four
cases involving due process challenges to punitive damages.79 After
Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court again addressed the due process
challenge in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.s° In this fraud
case, the plaintiffs alleged that an insurance agent pocketed premium
payments of the insureds and allowed the policies to be canceled without
any notice to the insureds."s The trial judge submitted the case to the jury
based on respondeat superior, and the Court held that finding Pacific Mutual
74. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10.6, at 354
(5th ed. 1995).
Procedural due process principles require that a person be given a fair process for
the deprivation of life, liberty, or property; these principles may require the
establishment of procedures to limit the discretion of courts or juries that award
punitive damages. When the Supreme Court uses the concept of substantive due
process to examine a law, including a court ruling, it is determining whether the
substantive rule of law is an unconstitutional limitation of life, liberty, or property
interests; substantive due process principles might be used to place a limit on the
size of punitive damage awards.
Id.
75. William H. Volz & Michael C. Fayz, Punitive Damages and the Due Process
Clause: The Search for Constitutional Standards, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 459, 470
(1992).
76. BLATT, supra note 40, at 27.
77. BLATT, supra note 40, at 27.
78. BLATT, supra note 40, at 27.
79. See BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991); Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
80. Halsip, 499 U.S. at 1.
81. Id. at 6.
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liable for punitive damages on the basis of respondeat superior did not
violate due process.8 2 Recognizing that no mathematical formula exists to
determine the constitutionality of a punitive award, the Court maintained
that reasonableness and sufficient instruction from the court in a jury trial
are factors in the inquiry. 3 Specifically, the Court found that the common
law method of assessing punitive damages was not per se unconstitutional,84
but it recognized the necessity of further examination to see if the award
itself violates due process because it "run[s] wild." 5  After examining
Alabama's procedures pertaining to punitive damages, the Court found that
the punitive award did not violate due process because Alabama's proce-
dures provided the necessary framework for the judge or jury to consider
when making a punitive award. 6
The Court found that the jury instructions adequately described the
nature and purpose of punitive damages and instructed the jury on what
factors should be considered. 7 Additionally, the Court noted that Alabama's
post-trial procedures for reviewing punitive awards provided sufficient
review by the trial court of the jury's discretion. 8 And the Alabama
82. Id. at 15. Plaintiff's attorneys claimed victory after the decision as the "presumably
pro-business Court" preserved their "most cherished weapon" by upholding the punitive
award that exceeded four times the actual damages. Joseph A. McDermott, III, Punitive
Damages are Constitutional-Sometimes, HOUSTON LAWYER, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 9.
83. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case. We can say, however, that general concerns of reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter
into the constitutional calculus.
Id.
84. Id. at 17. The Court based this conclusion on the fact that the common law method
of assessing punitive damages preexisted the Fourteenth Amendment, and the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment lacked any indication that the drafters intended to "overturn the
prevailing method." Id. at 17-18.
85. Id. at 18.
86. Id. at 22-23. The court said that Alabama's procedures "impose[d] a sufficiently
definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding
punitive damages." Id. at 22.
87. Id. at 22-23. A punitive damage award is "not to compensate the plaintiff for any
injury. It is to punish the defendant .... Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the
amount, you must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown
by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong." Id. at 6 n. 1.
88. Id. at 20. Alabama trial courts utilize a test formulated in Hammond v. City of
Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (1986), in which the court looked to the record to decide if the
jury determination should stand or be changed due to excessiveness. Hammond, 493 So. 2d
at 1379. Factors to be considered include the "culpability of the defendant's conduct," the
"desirability of discouraging others from similar conduct," "the impact upon the parties," and
"the impact on innocent third parties." Id.
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Supreme Court's review of punitive awards added another review of the
jury's or trial court's decision. 9 The Alabama Supreme Court provided an
additional check on the jury's or trial court's discretion by first applying a
comparative analysis and then by applying the substantive standards
developed by the court.90 The Court stated that Alabama's standards gave
the court a reasonable basis for deciding whether the award exceeded that
which is necessary to serve the functions of punishment and deterrence."
Although the punitive damages far exceeded the amount of fines and any
compensatory damages, the Court found that the award did not exceed
constitutional boundaries but ran "close to the line."92
One author said that courts interpret Haslip as a three-part test to
examine the constitutionality of punitive damages.9 3 However, a better
interpretation of Haslip requires an examination of the totality of the
circumstances.' The next punitive damages case the Court decided reached
the same conclusion, although in a plurality opinion. 95
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources, again the issue
presented was whether a punitive damage award violated the Due Process
Clause because the award was excessive or resulted from unfair procedure.96
TXO filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment to clear the title of an
89. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-2 1.
90. Id. at 21. The Alabama Supreme Court utilized the substantive factors enumerated
in Green Oil v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (1989), to help determine whether an award is
excessive or inadequate. Id. The factors include: (1) the reasonable relationship between
the punitive damages award and the harm likely to follow from the defendant's conduct, as
well as the actual harm; (2) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (3) the
profitability of the defendant's conduct; (4) the financial position of the defendant; (5) the
costs of the litigation; (6) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant; and (7) other
civil actions against the particular defendant. Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223-24.
91. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21.
92. Id. at 23-24.
93. Volz & Fayz, supra note 75, at 486-87. The three factors are the adequacy of the
jury instructions, access to trial court review, and access to appellate review. Volz & Fayz,
supra note 75, at 486.
94. Volz & Fayz, supra note 75, at 487. The Haslip Court applied a totality of the
circumstances analysis recognizing three factors important to the specific circumstances of
the case.
It is more accurate to view the [Haslip] Court's analysis as a response to the
structure of the Alabama scheme, rather than a pronouncement of a new test of
constitutionality.... Although a three part analysis was employed in [Haslip], the
due process analysis is improperly abbreviated by treating the three aspects of the
Alabama scheme as a three factor standard for constitutionality.
Volz & Fayz, supra note 75, at 486-87.
95. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
96. Id. at 446.
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interest in oil and gas rights.97 Alliance counterclaimed for slander of title.98
The trial court awarded Alliance costs for defending the declaratory
judgment action and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. 99
TXO filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for
remittur." TXO argued on due process grounds claiming that the jury
instructions failed to give the jury any guidance as to what constituted a
reasonable jury award, which resulted in a punitive award that had no
reasonable relationship to the actual damages.' The motions were denied,
and TXO appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court. 2 The court used
a reasonable relationship test which considered the potential harm the
defendant might have caused, the maliciousness of the defendant's conduct,
and the punishment necessary to deter future misconduct by the defendant.'03
The court upheld the punitive award based on these factors."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
award.'0 5 TXO first argued that the excessiveness of the award constituted
an "arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law.""'° TXO
urged the Court to adopt a heightened scrutiny standard, while Alliance
argued for the adoption of a rational basis review. 0 7 The Court rejected
both of these tests and relied on its decision in Haslip.'0° The Court
acknowledged that the West Virginia Supreme Court discussed that the
punitive award must be reasonable in comparison to the harm that could
have occurred in addition to the actual harm." The Court further approved
of the consideration of potential harm in Haslip." Although the ratio
97. Id. at 447.
98. Id.
99. Id. at451.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 452.
103. Id. at 453.
104. Id.
"The type of fraudulent action intentionally undertaken by TXO in this case could
potentially cause millions of dollars in damages to other victims. As for the
reprehensibility of TXO's conduct, we can say no more than we have already
said, and we believe the jury's verdict says more than we could say in an opinion
twice this length. Just as important, an award of this magnitude is necessary to
discourage TXO from continuing its pattern and practice of fraud, trickery and
deceit."
Id. (quoting TXO v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W.Va. 1992)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 455.
108. Id. at 458.
109. Id. at 460.
110. Id.
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
measured 526 to 1 in TXO and only 4 to 1 in Haslip, the Court emphasized
the potential loss to Alliance had TXO carried out its unlawful plan. 1"'
Unsurprisingly, the Court offered no additional guidance other than to
reaffirm the principles of Haslip. Once again, courts and attorneys awaited
the day that the Court would clarify what restraints due process imposes on
awards of punitive damages. This day came when the Court considered
BMW v. Gore."
12
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In BMW of North America v. Gore,"' the United States Supreme Court
held that the $2,000,000 punitive damage award exceeded the constitution-
ally permissible amount." 4 The Court began its analysis by discussing the
purpose of punitive damages and the state's interests that punitive damages
are intended to protect."' The Court acknowledged that states have a
legitimate interest in punishing and deterring wrongful conduct and that
awarding punitive damages advances this interest." 6 However, the Court
then recognized that a punitive award may violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment if the award is grossly excessive in compari-
son to the state's interests."
7
Examining the interests of the State of Alabama in this case, the Court
acknowledged that every state has a legitimate interest in shielding its
residents from deceptive trade practices."' However, the Court stated that
Alabama had no authority to interfere with the policy decisions of other
111. Id. at 462. As stated in Haslip, the Court said that the disparity here did not ."jar
one's constitutional sensibilities."' Id. (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
112. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996). People may have longed for this day only to be
disappointed because the Court again offered no concrete rule to decide when a punitive
award violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
113. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
114. Id. at 1604.
115. Id. at 1595.
116. Id.
In our federal system, States necessarily have considerable flexibility in
determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes
of cases and in any particular case. Most States that authorize exemplary
damages afford the jury similar latitude, requiring only that the damages awarded
be reasonably necessary to vindicate the State's legitimate interests in punishment
and deterrence.
Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Although states have this right, the protection need not be the same in all states.
Some states use the judicial process and others use the legislature to establish disclosure
requirements of car manufacturers, distributors, and dealers. Id. at 1596.
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states by forcing BMW to change its nationwide disclosure policy by
imposing a huge punitive award in this case. 9 Because the Alabama court
may only protect the interests of its citizens, the Court stated that the
punitive award could not be based on BMW's actions in other states. 2 ' The
Court elaborated that the award must be reviewed evaluating BMW's
conduct in relation to the interests of Alabama consumers, as opposed to the
interests of consumers nationwide.'
The Court also addressed the argument that BMW failed to receive fair
notice of the actions for which it might be held liable and the harshness of
the penalty that Alabama might dictate. 22 The Court's analysis continued
with a discussion of three considerations: the degree of reprehensibility of
the nondisclosure; the ratio of Dr. Gore's actual and potential harm to the
punitive award; and the difference between Dr. Gore's remedy and the
remedies authorized or utilized in other similar civil cases."2 Discussion of
these three factors indicated that BMW did not receive proper notice of the
sanctions Alabama might impose, and the Court found the punitive award
to be grossly excessive.
24
First, the Court addressed the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct.'25 The Court recognized this factor as "perhaps" the
most significant consideration in the reasonableness examination of a
punitive damages award.'26 The Court stated that an economic injury may
justify a significant penalty if deliberately inflicted through "affirmative acts
of misconduct" or when the "target is financially vulnerable."' 127 Also, the
119. Id. at 1597. Although Congress has the authority to implement a national disclosure
policy, an individual state may not legislate a national policy or subject other states to its
own disclosure standards. Id. at 1596-97.
120. Id. at 1598. Although Alabama can require BMW to follow its own disclosure
policy, it cannot penalize BMW for lawful actions in other states. Id. at 1597. The Court
noted that "[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do
is a due process violation of the most basic sort." Id. at 1597 n. 19 (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 1597. The Alabama Supreme Court acknowledged that the punitive award
against BMW could not be based on BMW's conduct outside of Alabama and remitted the
award founded on BMW's actions inside the state of Alabama. Id. at 1598.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1599.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Court noted that an economic injury alone may justify significant damages
when the "target is financially vulnerable .... But this observation does not convert all acts
that cause economic harm into torts that are sufficiently reprehensible to justify a significant
sanction in addition to compensatory damages." Id.
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Court suggested that conduct which recklessly jeopardizes the "health and
safety" of consumers is more reprehensible than mere economic injury. 2 '
Dr. Gore argued that BMW's failure to disclose the repairs to his car
created a pattern of tortious behavior sufficiently reprehensible to warrant
a hefty penalty.'29 To support this contention, Dr. Gore argued that the state
disclosure requirements supplement, instead of replace, the common law
fraud remedies and that BMW should have been aware that its disclosure
policy might expose them to liability for fraud. 30 Although the Court
recognized that stringent penalties may be necessary to remedy a situation
in which the defendant behaves in a manner that he knows or suspects is
against the law, the Court rejected Dr. Gore's arguments. 3 '
After reviewing the statutes of several states, the Court determined that
the state disclosure statutes could be construed as providing a "safe harbor"
for failing to disclose insignificant repairs. 32 Recognizing that BMW's
disclosure policy followed the most stringent state disclosure statute, the
Court found that BMW's conduct was not reprehensible enough to support
the $2,000,000 punitive damage award. 33
The Court addressed Dr. Gore's assertion that BMW should have been
aware that its nondisclosure policy might constitute fraud in various
jurisdictions."M The Court quickly discredited this argument stating that a
material misrepresentation or omission must have been made to rise to the
level of actionable fraud. 35 In this case, the evidence did not reveal any
deliberate false statements by BMW, affirmative acts of misconduct by
BMW, or bad faith hidden by BMW. 136 The Court found all of these factors
in both TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.'3 7 and Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Corp. v. Haslip31 which supported the punitive
awards in those cases. 139 Although the Court accepted the jury's determina-
tion that BMW violated Alabama law by concealing the material fact of the
128. Id. The refinishing of Gore's car had no impact on its "performance or safety
features." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1600.
131. Id. at 1600-01.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Court noted that this case, unlike Haslip and TXO, lacked evidence of any
"deliberate false statements, affirmative acts of misconduct, or concealment of evidence or
improper motive." Id. at 1601.
136. Id. at 1601.
137. 509 U.S. 443 (1993); see supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
138. 499 U.S. 1 (1991); see supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
139. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1601.
[Vol. 19
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
car's refinishing, the Court noted that intentional misrepresentation may be
more reprehensible than a mere omission of a material fact. 40 Finally, the
Court concluded that conduct which may hold a defendant liable in tort does
not automatically amount to conduct significantly reprehensible to justify a
profound punitive award such as the $2,000,000 award in this case.141
Second, the Court discussed the ratio of punitive damages to the actual
harm caused by the defendant.'42 In Haslip, the Court found that a punitive
award of four times the actual damages was within the constitutional limits,
although a close call.'43 The Court reaffirmed this analysis in TXO holding
that the appropriate question is "whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the
defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred." ' In
TXO, the Court upheld the $10,000,000 punitive award by considering the
potential harm had the defendant's tortious conduct proceeded. 45 The ratio
in TXO was not greater than 10 to 1' The disparity between Gore's actual
harm and the punitive award measured 500 to 1.47 The Court emphasized
that no bright line test exists to determine when an award exceeds a
constitutionally permissible amount, 4 ' but that a ratio of 500 to 1 was
suspect. 14
9
Third, the Court examined the punitive award in relation to the possible
civil and criminal sanctions for similar malfeasance. 5 ° The $2,000,000
punitive award in BMW dramatically exceeded any of the statutory penalties
available.' 5' The court noted that the maximum fine available under the
Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act was $2,000,52 and the most
stringent penalties of other states ranged from $5,000 to $10,000.1" After
considering the possible civil and criminal sanctions available, the Court
found the punitive award unjustified and unnecessary to deter similar future
140. Id. The Court indicated that BMW's failure to disclose the paint repair was less
reprehensible because BMW relied on state disclosure statutes to create its disclosure policy.
Thus, BMW believed in good faith that it had no duty to disclose the paint repair. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1602 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24).
144. Id. (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21) (emphasis in original).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1603.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 8-19-11(b) (1993)).
153. Id.
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behavior because less stringent sanctions may have been enough to compel
BMW to comply with the disclosure policy required by the Alabama
Supreme Court."5
In the only concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, with whom Justices
O'Connor and Souter joined, stated that the members of the Court have
usually agreed that a judgment deserves an earnest presumption of validity
when the judgment is the result of a fair process. 155 Justice Breyer also
noted that the Court previously found that procedures similar to the ones
used by the Alabama court were not unfair.15 6 He wrote the concurring
opinion to address the reasons why the presumption of validity was defeated
in this case." 7
First, Justice Breyer noted that the case resulted from a collection of
standards that did not limit the awarding of punitive damages.'58 Specifi-
cally, he found that the Alabama statute authorizing punitive damages for
fraud does not differentiate between conduct that supports a large award and
conduct that supports only a small award. 59 Additionally, Justice Breyer
stated that the Alabama Supreme Court's interpretation of the Green Oil v.
Hornsby factors failed to constrain the punitive award as intended. 60 He
found that the Alabama Supreme Court failed to utilize any other legal
standards besides the statute and the Green Oil factors in determining an
appropriate award. 16' Nor did Justice Breyer find any historical or
community standards or legislation providing any foundation for constrain-
ing a punitive award.'62
Second, Justice Breyer stated that the Court overcame the presumption
of validity because of the disparity between the state's interests and the
amount of the punitive award and the lack of legal standards providing
constraint. 63 Justice Breyer found the $2,000,000 punitive award arbitrary
and violative of the Due Process Clause.'
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion with which Justice Thomas
joined, 65 and Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion with which the
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1604 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 453).
156. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-24).
157. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 1609 (Breyer, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 1605 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993)).
160. Id. at 1606 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218 (Ala. 1989)).
161. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1607 (Breyer, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 1609 (Breyer, J., concurring).
163. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
164. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice joined."s Justice Scalia wrote a three-part opinion discussing
his disagreement with the Court. 67 Finding no support for a substantive due
process right against severe civil sanctions, 6 ' Justice Scalia stated that the
Court's opinion merely reflected the majority's objection to the amount of
punitive damages awarded by the jury as representatives of an outraged
community."' Justice Scalia then attacked the Court's remarks pertaining
to the punitive award and the consideration of conduct that occurred outside
of Alabama as being merely dicta. 70  Finally, he emphasized that the
Court's "guideposts" did not provide guidance, and thus the Court created
a constitutional right against unreasonable punitive damage awards. 
17
Also dissenting, Justice Ginsburg stressed that the Court infringed upon
an area customarily left to the states.'72 Finding that the Alabama Supreme
Court applied both the recent decisions of the Court, as well as its own laws
pertaining to punitive damages, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the punitive
award ought not be disturbed.
73
V. SIGNIFICANCE
After several futile attempts to constrain punitive damage awards prior
to BMW, the Court found an award to be excessive for the first time in this
case. 74  The significance of the case focuses on the Court's
acknowledgment that the award exceeded constitutional boundaries.'
166. Id. at 1614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1610-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1611-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1613-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Speaking of Justice Ginsburg's distaste for
the Court's interference in an area traditionally left to the states, one commentator wrote,
We salute the conservative justices for taking their commitment to federalism so
seriously. But it hardly seems a paragon of federalism to let a handful of local
courts impose their will on the consumers of an entire nation and flout the very
rule of law that America's Founding Fathers envisioned.
Not So Punitive Damages, THE ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 23, 1996, at 10.
173. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1616-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia stated "today's judgment represents the
first instance of this court's invalidation of a state-court punitive assessment as simply
unreasonably large." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). One commentator noted that "[i]t is now
clear that the Court is willing to reverse a grossly excessive punitive damage award even
where the state has procedural checks and balances in place." Christopher Borgeson,
Punitive Damages After BMW- Following the Guideposts, 11 NO. 6 CORP. COUNS. 2, 4
(Nov. 1996).
175. Borgeson, supra note 174, at 3. Borgeson reiterated that although the Court struck
down the punitive award, BMW was only a five-to-four opinion. Borgeson, supra note 174,
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Although the Court emphasized that no mathematical formula exists for
determining the constitutionality of punitive awards, the Court did more than
it had in the past by setting restrictions on the amount of punitive awards
through the guideposts.'76 BMW will impact litigation because trial lawyers
will utilize the guideposts to suit their fancy.' Likewise, BMW will play
a role in tort reform.'
Further, the Court's discussion of a defendant's out-of-state conduct
may also prove to be equally significant.'79 BMW indicates that litigators
must be diligent in the division of lawful and unlawful out-of-state conduct
because one state cannot impose punishment on a defendant for its lawful
conduct in another state.' 80 Although the Court's discussion of this issue
was only dicta, this issue is likely to be raised in both the courtroom, as
well as the legislative arena. 18
Despite the Court's ground breaking attempt to restrain punitive awards
by finally recognizing a punitive award as exceeding constitutional
boundaries, the effect of BMW remains uncertain. However, one thing is
certain--there will be much debate over tort reform of punitive damages as
at 3. He stated "Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Rehnquist have not wavered from
their view that constitutional scrutiny of punitive damage awards should be limited to
considerations of procedural due process; if the proper procedures are in place, the decisions
of the state courts should not be disturbed even if the court perceives them to be 'unfair.'
Borgeson, supra note 174, at 3.
176. Bruce J. Mckee, The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages
Litigation: Observations from a Participant, 48 ALA. L. REv. 175, 215 (1996). "[T]he
Court's three 'guideposts' are among the most comprehensive articulations of the subject of
punitive damages over the past decade. Certainly, they form the basis of an analysis that
must be undertaken by every court reviewing a punitive award in the future." Peter A.
Antonucci, BMW v. Gore: What Signal is the Supreme Court Really Sending on Punitive
Damages? WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 22, 1996.
177. Victor E. Schwartz, BMW v. Gore: What Does it Mean for the Future? 15 NO.
1 PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY 1, 3 (July, 1996). "Plaintiffs' lawyers will use them to argue
that punitive damages, however high, are appropriate. Defense lawyers will use them to
contend that high awards are unconstitutional." Id. Schwartz claims that the "degree of
reprehensibility" benefits plaintiffs and the "sanctions for comparable misconduct" favors
the defendants; however, he states that the "ratio of compensation to punitive damages" is
a "toss-up." Id.
178. Id. "BMW provides a basis for legislative action at both the state and federal levels.
Congress has the duty and power to implement 14th Amendment due process rights. The
Court's opinion is only a vague fabric to protect those rights." Id. Consumer groups on the
other side of the tort reform issue claim that BMW eliminates the necessity of tort reform of
punitive damages. Id. Henry Reske quoted Victor Schwartz, a tort reform advocate, who
commented that "(w]ithout legislation... 'this opinion can lead to unneeded... litigation
and continued unfairness. The Supreme Court can't police everything."' Henry J. Reske,
Guidelines Instead of Bright Lines, 82 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (July, 1996).
179. Schwartz, supra note 177, at 2-3.
180. Schwartz, supra note 177, at 2-3.
181. Schwartz, supra note 177, at 2-3.
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well as much litigation about the size of punitive awards where they seem
too large. 2
Mimi Bass Miller
182. Schwartz, supra note 177, at 4.
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